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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a Workmen's Compensation case concerning 
the interpretation of Utah Code Ann., 1953 Section 35-1-69. The 
major issues to be determined concern the apportionment of 
benefits in a situation where an employee has a pre-existing loss 
of bodily function disability and then suffers a work related 
injury resulting in addition loss of bodily function. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission of Utah has made the legal 
determination that Section 35-1-69 of the Utah Code Ann. does not 
allow for an apportionment of medical expenses and temporary 
total disability compensation between a pre-existing permanent 
loss of bodily function and a work related loss of bodily 
function. A Petition for Writ of Review and a Writ of Review 
brings this matter before the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs on appeal respectfully ask the decision of 
the Industrial Commission denying apportionment between the 
Second Injury Fund and the employer per Section 35-1-69 of the 
Utah Code Ann. be reversed by this Court. 
FACTS 
Anthony Capitano, the applicant before the Industrial 
Commission, was employed by Intermountain Smelting Corporation 
on June 9, 1976, when he stepped on a board that gave way causing 
him to fall approximately eleven feet to the ground. As a result 
t1r. Capitano suffered a crushing injury to his right ankle. 
(Record 43 and 158) As a result of that injury Mr. Capitano received 
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14, 1977, and medical compensation benefits for the care and 
treatment of his injury. (Record 35) 
The applicant simultaneously filed a claim pertaining 
to an accidental poisoning by lead or antimony or their compound; 
suffered while employed at Intermountain Smelting Corporation 
which occurred during the first ten days of December, 1975. 
Nothing regarding that incident is relevant to this appeal and 
therefore, it will not be discussed. (Record 15 8) 
The applicant had previously sustained a gunshot wound 
to his left leg or ankle while in the service in Korea and in 
connection with this injury he received a 30% disability rating 
by the Veterans Administration. He receives a monthly benefit 
of approximately $113 which will continue during the remainder 
of his life. (Record 35, 38, 54, 158) The Medical Panel 
appointed by the Industrial Commission found that the applicant 
had sustained a 30% loss of use of his right foot as a result of 
the industrial injury of June 9, 1976. The Panel also found tha: 
the applicant had a 30% loss of use of his left foot due to the 
war injury. The Panel stated that the applicant had experienced 
increasing symptoms of the left ankle that were definitely relatE 
to the injury of his right ankle due to the changes in the weigh: 
bearing tendencies as a result of the combined injuries. The 
Medical Panel further found that the combined overall effects 
of both of the injuries gave the applicant a total loss of bo~t 1 
function of the whole man of 25'7,. The !1edical Panel could not 
further break down the relationship of the total 25'7, as to whk 
ankle had contributed how much to the total loss of bodily 
function. (Record 150 151) 
-3- • 
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With that information the Administrative Law Judge, 
as concurred in by the Commission, made a determination in a very 
well thought out opinion that using the American Medical Association's 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, an 8 1/2% loss of 
the whole man could be attributed to the industrial injury. Further, 
he found that the remaining 16 1/2% loss to the whole man could be 
attributed to the preexisting condition. A finding was also 
made that the 16 1/2% was a substantially greater loss than 
the applicant would have incurred if he had not had the pre-
existing injury. The Commission went on to state as a finding 
that that circumstance qualifies the applicant for additional 
benefits payable out of the Special Fund under the provisions 
set forth in Section 35169 Utah Code Ann. (Record 159 160) 
With that assessment, plaintiff on appeal fully concurs. 
The error claimed by plaintiff on appeal is the failure 
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
of Utah to accord to the employer and its insurance carrier 
the right of having the Second Injury Fund reimburse them 
from the Second Injury or Special Fund a proportionate share 
of the medical compensation benefits and the temporary total 
loss of bodily function benefits. There is no issue concerning 
permanent partial disability benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS ON APPEAL ARE ONLY LIABLE FOR THAT PERCENTAGE 
OF THE TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL EXPENSES 
COMPENSATION AS THE PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY 
FROM THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BEARS TO THE TOTAL PERMANENT PARTIAL 
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DISABILITY FROM ALL CAUSES. 
This appeal is based upon the law as stated in Section 
35-1-69 of the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. For the Court', 
information and as it may recall there are several consolidated 
cases dealing with the same issues as presented in this appeal. 
The Court may wish to refer to Supreme Court Nos. 15882, 15881, 
and 15796. Oral argument has been presented in those above three 
cases and the Court currently has those matters under considerati:1 
For the convenience of the Court the pertinent parts o' 
Section 35-1-69 of the Utah Code Ann. are set out below. 
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an 
industrial injury for which compensation and 
medical care is provided by this title that 
results in a permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have 
insurred if he had not had the pre-existing 
incapacity, compensation and medical care, 
which medical care and other related items 
are outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded 
on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liabilit of the em lo er for such 
medica 
Next, the statute describes the duties of a Medical Fa;, 
which is followed by an expression of the duty of the Industrial 
Commission: 
The Industrial Commission shall then assess 
a liability for compensation and medical care to 
the employer on the basis of the percentage of 
permanent physical impairment attributable to 
the industrial injury only, and the remainder 
shall be payable out of said Special Fund. 
Amounts, if any, which have been paid bt the 
em lo er ln excess of the ortion attri utable 
to t e sal industrlal injurt, s al e reim-
bursed to the employer out o sald Soecial Fund. 
-5-
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The Commission through its Administrative Law Judge 
states that it was not the intent of the legislature to 
entitle an injured workman a double recovery for a pre-existing 
condition that otherwise would meet the criteria for payment 
from the Special Fund. In the case at bar the injured workman 
was receiving disability comepnsation from the Federal Government 
for what amounted to an 8 1/2% loss of the whole man, leaving 
8 1/2% to be compensated by the employer and his insurance 
carrier and yet another 8% uncompensated if not by the Special 
Fund. 
Arguendo, by Section 35-1-69 the applicant may or may 
not be entitled to the total 16 1/2% loss of the whole man 
attributable to the service connected injury. Nonetheless, 
even if the employee himself is not entitled to benefits 
from the Second Injury Fund, the employer's and its insurance 
carrier's "liability ... for such compensation and medical 
care shall be for the industrial injury only Section 
35-1-69, supra. In other words, even if the employee has 
received prior compensation from some other source, the 
employer cannot be made to pay any more than the damage actually 
caused by the compensible on-the-job injury. Stated still 
another way, it is clear from the wording of Section 35169, 
supra, that it is intended not only as a benefit to the 
employee, but also as a limitation of the extent of liability 
of an employer. As such, the fact of prior compensation from 
another source should not be visited upon the employer to 
increase his liability. That would be contrary to the clear policy 
that "the liability of the employer for such compensation and 
-6-
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medical care shall be for the industrial injury only 
Section 35-1-69, supra. 
The apportionment of liability as herein requested 
is not without precedent. The case of Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (1977) is the most recent 
interpretation of Section 35-1-69, supra. Therein, the 
applicant suffered from a pre-existing psychological condition 
relating to pain in her back. A back strain at work resulted 
in a medical determination that she had a 30% permanent 
partial disability with 10 % of that pre-existing and 20% due 
to the on-the-job incident. 
In reversing the Industrial Co=ission for its failure 
to apportion the compensation payable (including permanent 
partial disability and temporary total disability) and the 
medical expenses, the Court stated the following: 
The position of the defendant as reflected 
in the Collliilission's order seems to be predi-
cated on the assumption that because the 
pre-existing condition was quiescent and did 
not require medical treatment until the 
accident, the plaintiff employer should be 
held responsible for the entire expense thereof. 
But it will be noted that the statute makes no 
a~stinct~on between the award for 
at 562 
The Court continues to explain what is meant by a 
"permanent incapacity . substantially greater than if the 
pre-existing incapacity had not existed . 
-7-
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One more time the Industrial Commission, in its 
Denial of Motion for Review (R. 171), appears in essence to 
be saying that the Court didn't mean what it said in the Ortega 
case, supra. The Commission goes beyond the four squares of 
this Court's opinion and facts upon which that opinion is 
based and implies that the Court was ill-informed on the 
totality of the evidence. The Commission seems to be attempting 
to retry Ortega, supra. , because it does not care for the 
clear pronouncement of law contained therein and in Section 
35-1-69, supra, because of its concern about its administration 
of the Special Fund. 
The Commission would further want this Court to limit 
the application of the Ortega rule by excluding temporary total 
and medical benefits. Both the Ortega decision and Section 
35-l-69 state that compensation and medical care are to be 
apportioned. That "compensation" includes temporary total 
and medical benefits is put to rest by the definition of 
"comoensation" in the Act itself. 
- Q_ 
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. . The following terms as used in this 
title shall be construed as follows: 
(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments 
and benefits provided for in this title." 
Section 35-1-44(6) UCA, 1953. 
In all of this discussion, we should not forget the 
basic purpose of Second Injury Funds. Professor Arthur Larson: 
his learned treatise very aptly states the public policy which 
dictated the passage of such legislation: 
Under either rule, then, the compensation 
system operated unsatisfactorily in the case 
of previously impaired workers: Under appor-
tionment, they received far less than their 
actual condition required to prevent desti-
tution; under nonapportionment they lost their 
jobs. Second Injury Funds, which have been 
adopted in all but four states, are the 
solution to this dilemma. The usual provision 
makes the employer ultimately liable only 
for the amount of disability attributable 
to the particular injury occurring in his 
employment, which the Fund pays the difference 
between that amount and the total amount to 
which the employee is entitled for the com-
bined effects of his prior and present injury. 
Larson's Horkman's Com~ensation Law, Vol. 2, 
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CONCLUSION 
This Appeal is somewhat unique in that the applicant 
and his employer and the employer's insurance company are not 
adverse parties for the purposes of this Appeal. All should be 
in agreement that the apportionment of Section 35-1-69, 
supra, is clearly the way these and similar matters are to 
be handled. The adverse party is the Special Fund as administered 
by the Industrial Commission. 
In summary, Section 35-1-69, supra, and the Ortega case, 
supra, leave but one conclusion as to the liability of the 
employer for the injuries suffered by the applicant herein. 
The employer should be responsible only for the percentage of 
the industrial injury loss of bodily function bears to the total 
loss of bodily function percentage from all causes or 8.5% to 25% 
or 34% of the compensation benefits for medical and hospital bills 
and for the temporary total disability period. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this case 
be reversed and remanded to the Industrial Commission with 
proper instructions that the employer and its insurance carrier 
be reimbursed 66% of the monies advanced to the applicant for 
medical and hospital compensation benefits and temporary total 
compensation benefits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUMBITTED this-4/ ___ day of August, 1979. 
BLACK & MOORE 
-10-
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Frank Nelson 
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